BOOK EXCERPT

Outnumbered, Outgunned, Undeterred

In an excerpt from his new book, Rob Johnson looks at two historic battles in which men and women fought, endured, and, perhaps, emerged victorious, though the odds were against them.

What is it that compels men and women to fight and perhaps emerge victorious, though all the odds may be against them? Outnumbered, Outgunned, Undeterred ranges across the globe and history, from George Washington’s rebuilding of the Patriot army in the American War of Independence to the defense of the Philippines in 1941-42, and from Simón Bolívar’s liberation of South America to The Retreat from Chosin Reservoir, Korea, 1950, which is included here.

The British Army at Delhi, India, 1857

Outnumbered British forces, surrounded and deprived of logistical support or hope of relief, fought on against determined Indian mutineers in 1857. Although unable to trust their formerly loyal subjects, the British made use of civilian and allied military personnel, especially the Gurkhas and Sikhs, not only to withstand sieges such as Lucknow, but also to maintain a siege of Delhi, even though the city was strongly held by far larger numbers of mutineers. The climax of the campaign was marked by the relief of Lucknow and other cantonments, yet it was the assault on Delhi that, in spite of all the orthodox principles of war, succeeded in breaking the back of the rebellion.

The outbreak of the mutiny, known in India as the First War of Independence (many civilians rose up alongside the nation’s troops), was sparked by the refusal of sepoys from the Bengal Presidency army to accept a new rifle. They resisted because its cartridges, which had to be bitten before use to release the gunpowder, were greased in pig and cow fat. Since the former animal was considered unclean by Muslims, and the latter sacred by Hindus, the greased car-
assailants at bay for five hours, but then their ammunition ran out. They knew their fate was sealed but resolved that the ammunition and powder of the arsenal should not fall into the rebels’ hands. Thereupon they decided to sacrifice themselves for the greater good. Lieutenant Willoughby set the fuse, and soon after the entire building was obliterated by a giant explosion. The detonation tore down neighbouring buildings and killed scores of rebels. Miraculously, six officers survived the blast and, in all the confusion, they escaped the city. At this stage of the battle the sepoys who had helped recapture the Main Guard now threw in their lot with the mutineers, and the surviving British soldiers and civilians were forced to flee-most making for the ridge to the northwest of the city. From there, telegraph officers sent urgent warnings to other garrisons about what had occurred.

Although the rebels outnumbered the British survivors, they made no move against them. Inside the city, the mutineers refused to cooperate with each other, and there was even disagreement over the execution of 52 European civilians who had been captured alive earlier in the day. Some of the rural population had joined the revolt, but others saw merely an opportunity to loot or extort from both sides and cared little for liberation or loyalty.

By 17 May, the British survivors of Delhi were joined by the garrisons of Ambala and Meerut and, under the command of General Barnard, this small contingent managed to wrest the Delhi Ridge from a larger force of mutineers at the Battle of Badli-ki-Serai. The ridge lay just three-quarters of a mile from the Kashmiri Gate of Delhi, with a canal to its west. The British built a series of redoubts along the crest, and the centre of the position, known as Hindu Rao’s house, was occupied by the loyal Gurkhas of the Sirmoor Battalion. Unfortunately, the south of the ridge led into a maze of village streets and gardens, providing plenty of cover for the approach of their attackers. Through the days of May and June, more and more mutineers poured into the city from the south and east. From the ridge it was clear that Delhi was held too strongly for the British to even consider taking it by storm, unless they could muster greater numbers. It also became apparent that it was they who would be besieged, not the city of Delhi.

As early as 19 June, the mutineers made a major attack on the ridge, pushing in from three directions. The British and their allies were only just able to cling on and for a time contemplated evacuating the position altogether. Despite overwhelming odds, they fought on. Four days later the rebels tried again, and for a second time came within a hair’s breadth of victory. The ridge was wreathed in smoke, with much of the fighting at close quarters. When the smoke cleared and the mutineers pulled back, bodies could be seen strewn across the ridge and its approaches. For days, these corpses putrefied and the mutineers pulled back, bodies could be seen strewn across the ridge and its approaches. For days, these corpses putrefied and a serious risk of contamination and disease, especially cholera, added to the burdens on the exhausted British force. The heat grew intense and the only relief from the sun was the camp of flimsy tents erected behind the ridge, just out of reach of the cannon fire and buzzing musket balls. Periodic alarms from the picquets in front of the ridge roused the British to stave off another attack, but each clash caused their numbers to dwindle still further. In one week in July, 25 officers and 400 men were killed or wounded resisting raids. While rebels possessed 10 cavalry regiments, 15 infantry regiments and an unknown number of well-trained artillerymen, the British lamented their lack of siege guns and transport, the result of earlier cost-cutting measures in peacetime.

Hopes were raised by the arrival of the Corps of Guides, an elite Muslim formation 600 strong. To support the soldiers on the ridge, the unit’s six companies of infantry and three troops of cavalry had braved the broiling sun and force-marched from the Punjab — travelling over 500 miles (800 km) in just three weeks. Soon after, Brigadier John Nicholson, a veteran of the Sikh Wars leading a force of 4,200 men and a siege train of guns, was within reach of the reinforced garrison. To prevent the British from mounting a bombardment with this new ordinance, the mutineers made a desperate sortie
on 25 August at the height of the monsoon, but Nicholson had anticipated the move and routed the rebels at the Battle of Najafgarh. His technique was as much psychological as military: he had his guns open fire but ordered the infantry to march silently against the rebels until they were within just 110 yards (100 m), whereupon they delivered a single, devastating volley and then charged, bayonets leveled, with an indescribable war cry. The rebels bolted and most of the British force could concentrate on bayoneting and clubbing their way into a hastily built redoubt. The morale of the British on the ridge soared, but the mood among the rebels was one of bitterness and recrimination against their leaders.

The British redoubts were now filled with guns: 15 twenty-four-pounders, 20 eighteen-pounders, and 25 mortars and howitzers, supported by 600 cartloads of ammunition. By stages, new batteries were constructed closer to the walls of Delhi. First, the rebels’ guns on the Mori Bastion on the western wall were silenced, and this led the mutineers to believe that the British would assault from this direction. New batters were built opposite the Kashmiri Gate. Alerted to the direction of this attack, the mutineers tried to shoot down the men as they set their explosives. It was a tense few minutes, but the charge detonated successfully and the third column fought its way through the debris into the city.

A fourth column, meanwhile, had attacked the Kabul Gate but was repulsed after initial success. It was bundled back so precipitously that the rebel counterattack threatened to retake the Delhi Ridge altogether. With the British forces battling away in the north of the city, only the reserve and the British cavalry could stem the rebel streaming out of the Kabul Gate. Neville Chamberlain, an officer badly wounded in an earlier battle, directed the battery at Hindu Rao’s house from his stretcher. The British troops on the ridge were themselves pounded by rebel guns, including some of their own that had been captured in the withdrawal.

At the same time, in the city, their attack was also in danger of failure. Nicholson’s own column was twice thrown back because rebel musketeers could both pour fire down into the streets from flat rooftops and windows, and fire grapeshot from doorways down the narrow alleyways. Nicholson himself led a third charge towards the Burn Bastion and was mortally wounded. Checked at this point, the column pulled back to the area around the Church of St. James. General Archdale Wilson contemplated abandoning the attack altogether, but Nicholson, although dying, would hear none of it. For two days, the combat went on in and around the British bridgehead. Some rebel Muslim troops, calling themselves Mujahideen, wanted to fight to the death, but many of the rebels were dispirited by their losses and the sheer determination of their opponents to fight on. Gradually, the British managed to extend the area under their control. They retook the ruined magazine on 16 September and three days later recovered the palace. Bahadur Shah, the reluctant and inert leader of the revolt, had fled before they arrived, but he was captured by a detachment of cavalry soon after. Fearful that they might be trapped as the British took each bastion in turn, the majority of the rebels began to evacuate the city. On 21 September, after an epic battle lasting eight days, Delhi was back in British hands. Nicholson, satisfied, passed away two days later.

The force of British and loyal Indian troops had numbered 10,000 with Sikh, Gurkha, and Pathan allies estimated at 3,000. In the final assault, over 5,700 of the British and their Indian allies had been killed or wounded. The casualty figures for the 42,000 rebels are unknown, but their losses may have been of a similar nature. The stakes had been very high. The British knew that their ability to govern rested on breaking both the capability and the will of the rebel forces at India’s former capital; indeed, the fall of Delhi proved a major psychological blow for the rebellion. By retaking the city, the British had signaled their determination to reassert exclusive rule. Angered by the massacre of British civilians, there were many who advocated a punitive regime, but, despite isolated atrocities, both the British and the Indians were eager to restore peace and order.

In the defense of the Delhi Ridge, the British and their allies had suffered from critical short-
ages of everything required for war. They had been depleted by diseases, debilitated by heat, and harried by frequent raids or more serious attacks, yet clung to their position with great resolve. It is a principle of war that a force should not make an attack on an enemy position without odds greater than three to one, but at Delhi, in the final assault, the British were outnumbered by that same ratio.

While they possessed a superior armament of heavy guns and rifled muskets, this counted for little in the close-quarter fighting of the assault: the narrow streets and labyrinth of fighting positions actually conferred all the advantages on the defenders. In all, the defense of the Delhi Ridge and the retaking of the city should have both failed, and the actions of those men during the desperate months provide an inspirational reminder of resilience and endurance. The force at Delhi, despite all the odds against them, had not only recaptured a city, they had, in effect, achieved a strategic victory that enabled Britain to dominate India more comprehensively than ever before.

**The Retreat From Chosin Reservoir, Korea, 1950**

In late 1950, United Nations troops — consisting principally of United States personnel — defeated the offensive of the Korean People’s Army, and threw the Communist North Koreans back beyond the 38th Parallel (the border that had partitioned the peninsula in 1945). Breaking out from the Pusan Perimeter in South Korea, the UN forces had temporarily defeated the North Koreans, using amphibious landings at the Battle of Inchon to crush what was left of their resistance. The UN advanced steadily northwards with the intention of eventually reuniting the two portions of the country. The People’s Republic of China saw the situation very differently. Having struggled to win a civil war just a year before, China believed the Americans would attempt to roll back the Communist tide and invade China from its new Korean springboard. In secret, Chinese forces were amassed to strike back at the UN as they approached the Yalu River. The Chinese Ninth Army was redeployed from Manchuria so hastily that it was forced to leave behind its heavy artillery, but it was the failure to acquire any winter clothing that was to prove an even more costly oversight. On 15 October 1950, this People’s Volunteer Army (PVA) slipped undetected across the Chinese boarder and into North Korea.

Facing them was the UN advance. On the western side of the Taeback Mountains, which formed the spine of the country, lay the US Eighth Army, while to the east were the Republic of Korea 1 Corps and the US X Corps. In this eastern zone, a surprise attack was made by the Chinese 42nd Corps, which clashed with the South Koreans on 25 October in the Funchilin Pass, south of the Chosin Reservoir basin. Meanwhile, the 1st US Marine Division, which had landed on the east coast at Wonsan as part of the X Corps order of battle, engaged this forward Chinese element on 2 November. Taking heavy losses, the Chinese vanguard retreated towards the Chosin Reservoir itself. Within three weeks of this first contact, the Marines were in possession of the entire basin, with troops stationed at Sinhung-ni on the southern side of the reservoir and at Yudam-ni on the western side. To the west the Chinese had struck against the US Eighth Army, which was in difficulties. To relieve their pressure, General Douglas MacArthur, the UN commander in Korea, ordered X Corps to drive westwards and threaten the Chinese lines of communications. This, however, had the effect of stringing the corps out across a long front, leaving it more vulnerable to a fresh Chinese offensive from the North.

The bulk of the PVA Ninth Army crossed the North Korean border on 10 November and arrived, undetected, around Chosin on 17 November. Chinese reconnaissance revealed a number of weaknesses in the UN disposi-
Koto-ri and on to the port of Hungnam appeared to be the Americans’ only line of retreat. The Chinese plan was to neutralize the three positions around the reservoir and then, as the UN forces came in from the south to relieve them, they in turn would be encircled and destroyed. The only difficulty the Chinese had was determining the actual strength of the UN forces since time was short. They nevertheless felt confident that their 60,000 men could overwhelm the relatively small detachments confronting them. Moreover, by infiltrating and maximizing the element of surprise they would be able to defeat the Westerners while suffering relatively low casualties.

What the Chinese commanders did not realize was that the US 1st Marine Division (reinforced by the British 41 Royal Marines Commando, and two American infantry battalions) had arrived at Yudam-ni, which meant that the total strength of UN forces was close to 27,000.

The Chinese began their attacks at night on 27 November. Ambushes were conducted against mobile units, while massive infantry assaults swept on to the defended garrisons around the reservoir. At Yudam-ni, the Marines were soon surrounded, and tried to make sense of the confused situation while fighting along a hastily formed perimeter. On the eastern side of the reservoir, Regiment Combat Team 31 found itself similarly isolated and under attack from two divisions, the 80th and 81st. Further south, US Marines at Koto-ri were being attacked by another division. Taken by surprise, each formation was initially fighting for its survival.

At Yudam-ni, the 5th US Marines tried to drive their assailants westwards and made attacks in the direction of Mupyong-ni, but they were soon pinned down by the Chinese 89th Division and subsequently attacked by five infantry battalions of the 79th, another Chinese division that had unexpectedly arrived in the vicinity. On the mountain slopes the Americans found the Chinese trying to infiltrate between their platoons, with only boulders and the folds in the ground for cover. Close-quarter fighting erupted both in front of and between the American’s positions, and casualties were high on both sides. By dawn on the 28th, the five Chinese battalions had been so decimated they could take no further part in the battle.

Immediately to the south, the Chinese 59th Division encountered two companies of the 7th US Marines and subjected them to a ferocious attack. Only Charlie Company was able to extricate itself (and this with some difficulty) then fight its way back into the Yudam-ni pocket. Fox Company was not so fortunate and became cut off in the Toktong Pass. This defeat was of great strategic value because it controlled the road between Yudam-ni and the junction at Hagaru-ri. The PVA 59th Division made repeated attempts to wipe out this Marine company, but the defenders clung to their rocks despite sub-zero temperatures, a lack of ammunition and rations, and the constant fire from the Chinese all around them. The US 7th Marines tried to break through to rescue the beleaguered force, but, despite inflicting grievous losses, they couldn’t reach their comrades. For five days and nights, the Marines at Toktong held out alone and unsupported.

The Chinese commanders were surprised by the strength and tenacity of the Americans. They realized rather belatedly that there were far more Marines at Yudam-ni than they had initially estimated and they were concerned about the high casualties they had suffered already. The decision was therefore taken to switch the axis of their offensive in order to overrun the Hagaru-ri position, and then to cut off all the UN forces in the area. At the same time, the lull in attacks gave the surrounded Americans at Yudam-ni the chance to recover. It was at this point they received orders to make for Hungnem Port, orders that meant fighting their way out along a road 78 miles (126 km) long that was often overlooked by mountains, dissected by defiles and steep ridges, and made treacherous by ice and snow. For armoured support, the Marines had only one Sherman tank, although they could have air support when the weather permitted it. Even to begin, however, the 5th and 7th Marines realized that they would have to capture Hills 1419 and 1542, topography that dominated the route south, and furthermore they would have to make a fresh attempt to relieve Fox Company at the Toktong Pass.

The Chinese meanwhile launched the 79th, a fresh division, against the garrison of Yudam-ni on 1 December. Using the cover of darkness, the Chinese infantry bravely advanced into a storm of small-arms fire and made such progress that the Marines’ rear guard was forced to call in airstrikes to break up the Chinese formations. Vast explosions lit up the night and the Americans slipped away from Yudam-ni. At the head of the Marines’ column, the attack of Hill 1419 was already underway. Artillery and air bombardments devastated the defenders, and the PVA 59th Division that held the hill was forced to commit the last company from its reserve. The survivors, a mixture of units, refused to relinquish the high ground and it was not until nightfall on 1 December that the Marines finally managed to secure the heights. The Chinese they found lacked rations and winter equipment, and it was evident that many had suffered from frostbite. For the Marines, taking the hill represented a tactical victory of some significance. Dominating the surrounding landscape, they were able to advance on either side of the road leading south, and in doing so, surprise or encircle Chinese blocking positions. On 2 December, the 7th Marines were able to launch an attack towards the Toktong Pass, while simultaneously, Fox Company made a breakout assault. The pass was soon in American hands, freeing up another stage of the route south.

The Americans still had to fight their way at every step of the retreat. Individual Chinese posts...
opened up on the column of vehicles at every opportunity, causing significant delays. On 2 December, the Chinese launched a major night attack with their infantry, sweeping out of the hills and causing heavy losses among the Marines. The assault was beaten off only after a prolonged firefight and the arrival of American jets, which blasted the Chinese positions.

While the Yudam-ni garrison managed to extricate itself, the Regimental Combat Team 31 (RCT 31) had been less fortunate. This reduced brigade was stretched across a large area at the start of the battle and on the night of 27 November a Chinese division had sought to wipe them out. Many individual units were overrun and completely destroyed and by the end of the night, RCT 31 found itself in three isolated pockets: surrounded, outnumbered, and overlooked by the Chinese on Hill 1221. As fortune would have it, many Chinese troops believed that the battle was over, and they began to loot the stores they found in the RCT perimeter for the clothing and food that they so desperately needed. This lack of battle discipline gave the Americans an opportunity to counter-attack, and the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, although severely outgunned, assaulted the main Chinese force at a position known as the Inlet. The sudden attack took the Chinese by surprise and the PVA troops fell back hastily during the confusion. The Americans considered a more deliberate pursuit, but fresh Chinese attacks soon dispelled such optimism on that score. Three Chinese regiments from the 80th Division made a night attack, but the configuration of the ground at the Inlet and problems in communications caused the attack to lose cohesion. As the leading Chinese infantry came within range of the Americans, the US 57th Field Artillery Battalion used its 40 mm anti-aircraft guns in an anti-personnel role. The heavy rounds tore through the densely packed Chinese ranks and some shells struck the rocky terrain, adding to the shrapnel effect and increasing the number of casualties. Both advancing and retreating Chinese units were cut to pieces by this gunfire. Only 609 of the division’s men survived, but the PVA commanders were still eager to resume the offensive and deployed wings to work their way around the Americans’ flanks.

The Americans knew it was only a matter of time before another assault was launched and they fully anticipated heavy artillery bombardments by the Chinese. Consequently, 31st Tank Company tried to open up a route to RCT 31 by storming Hill 1221. Without integral infantry units, however, the unsupported armour struggled to scale the steep terrain or to defeat infantry. The attacks, occurring over two successive days, failed. Within the RCT 32 perimeter, ammunition was running low along with other combat supplies. There were also a number of wounded men to evacuate, and that meant fresh attempts would have to be made to take Hill 1221 for its own airfield.

The Chinese were determined to destroy RCT 31 before it could slip away and replaced their existing formations with the 94th Division before a major night attack was launched on 30 November. Despite the fighting continuing well into the next day, the Americans again clung to their positions. RCT 31 planned to attempt a breakout, but even before the column of vehicles had formed, another PVA assault was made. The perimeter was now in danger of complete collapse and it was clear that only the most desperate measures could save the unit from being destroyed. Air support was an option, but the Chinese had already engaged in a close-quarter battle with the Americans. The extreme decision was taken to order a napalm drop right on the vanguard of their own column, despite the losses this would obviously entail. The effect was utterly devastating. The slopes that lay in front of the Americans erupted in vast orange balls of fire and oily black smoke. Chinese infantry still attempting to push forward, the Chinese troops left alive in the rocks and ravines of Hill 1221 opened fire and pinned down the assaulting troops. Any soldiers scrambling up the slopes were swiftly cut down. As the vehicles of the column inched their way along the road that ran below the summit they were raked with gunfire. Wounded men were hit again, drivers were killed, and there was the risk that these survivors would be overtaken by the three Chinese Regiments that were now converging on them from the north. Lieutenant Colonel Don Carlos Faith Jr (the commander of RCT 31) inspired his men whenever he went among them, keeping the troops moving and fighting as best he could. When the column was halted by a Chinese roadblock he led the platoon attack personally, but was wounded mortally when a grenade exploded. It took a gargantuan effort to assault and eventually clear the roadblock. The column continued through the hills, still subjected to machine-gun fire at every stop until they were once more halted by a Chinese roadblock. This time, the Chinese started to pour fire down from every side. Hundreds of PVA started to skirmish forward, the RCT 31 defenders taking what cover they could among the boulders and trucks. Fighting was now at close quarters, and the Americans were being wiped out, a handful at a time. Small groups tried to fight their way out of the trap, some successfully, others not. Only 385 survived unscathed to reach Hagaru-ri.

The small garrison at Hagaru-ri had been fighting just as desperately from the beginning of the Chinese offensive. Storemen, cooks, and drivers had been pressed into the firing line to augment the inadequate number of riflemen available. It was still not enough. In a daring night attack, the Chinese had managed to penetrate the perimeter, cut down some of the defenders, and charge into
the logistics areas. Once there, however, their cohesion and direction collapsed, giving the Americans time to launch hasty counter-attacks that gradually drove the Chinese troops out. At dawn, the Chinese remained in possession of the East Hill on the base's northern perimeter, but had been driven back and surrendered all their other gains.

To assist the embattled garrison of Hagaru-ri, a relief detachment was dispatched from Koto-ri further south on 29 November. The group was nicknamed Task Force Drysdale after its commander, a British officer who led both the unit and the spearhead element of 41 Commando Royal Marines. G Company, 1st Marines and B Company, 31st Infantry completed the relief force. This tiny composite battalion faced a near-impossible task, and came under constant attack from the PVA 60th Division from the start. The road that marked the axis of the advance was soon dubbed 'Hell Fire Valley' because of the intensity of the bombardments zeroing-in there. During the day, one disabled vehicle blocked the progress of the force and attacks by the Chinese broke the formation into two parts. The lead element pressed on and managed to reach Hagaru-ri after dark. The rear element was completely wiped out by Chinese attacks.

At Hagaru-ri the next day, fresh attempts were made to retake East Hill, but it remained in the Chinese hands with high numbers of casualties on both sides. On 30 November, the remaining troops of the Chinese 58th Division assembled for a final overnight assault on the perimeter of Hagaru-ri, using the East Hill as part of their assembly area. Initially they enjoyed some success and the UN defences around the base of East Hill were overrun, but as the 58th tried to get further forward they were cut down. Machine-gun fire and the guns of the 31st Tank Company forced the Chinese to fall back, and rendered them unable to mount further offensive operations.

A few days after the epic defense of these UN perimeters, the breakout from the reservoir could begin in earnest. When the 5th Marines arrived at Hagaru-ri, they were able to assist in the retaking of the East Hill and help secure the UN lines. In the interval, Chinese reinforcements had also arrived but the chance to snuff out the defenders at Hagaru-ri had passed. When two fresh PVA divisions made a night attack, they were thrown back and destroyed without taking a single objective. The US 7th Marines had meanwhile taken the high ground on either side of the road to the south. The Chinese therefore shifted their attacks to these heights in the hope of cutting off the retreat. Again, Chinese assaults were delivered with great determination and at the cost of heavy casualties. The UN column was reduced to a snail's pace as each attack was beaten off, while American aircraft were busy strafing Chinese attackers as they tried to form up. By 7 December, the UN forces had made it to Koto-ri-safe, if tired and battle-worn by their experiences.

The Chinese now renewed their efforts to pursue the Americans and positioned the remnants of their 20th Corps, which had borne the brunt of earlier fighting, on the UN withdrawal route. Attempts were made by the Chinese to blow the Treadway Bridge near the Funchilin Pass and they rendered it impassable. The 1st US Marines subsequently took the adjacent high ground known as Hill 1081 in a sharp action, and a new bridge was constructed. The Marines were astonished to find that, while the Chinese at Hill 1081 had fought to the last man, some troops had frozen to death in their dugouts and foxholes. The critical supply situation in the Chinese PVA had reached the point of crisis, and their men were dying of starvation or hypothermia. Although the Chinese could still muster more men and make attacks on the UN rearguard, the Americans had the firepower to defeat them.

The UN forces finally reached Hungnam on 11 December having fought continuously for 15 days. While an evacuation was organized, the US Navy provided additional fire support to the garrison, which helped repulse the final offensives of the depleted PVA Ninth Army. It took less than two weeks to extract the entire force from Hungnam. Despite all the odds against them, the UN had carried out a fighting retreat and managed to bring away over 100,000 troops, a similar number of Korean civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of combat supplies. The PVA had been deprived of its showpiece victory and its Ninth Army had ceased to exist as a combat effective force (until substantially reconstituted the following year). While casualty figures were never agreed, even official Chinese sources admitted to losses in excess of 50,000 men. The UN lost 1,029 killed, with a further 4,852 wounded and 5,000 missing. The figures show that the UN had been able to withdraw under constant pressure and still operate as an effective force, inflicting grievous losses on an enemy that was not only substantially larger, but also possessed the initiative at the start of the operations.

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